leading authors to regard as natural law or Dworkin Fuller). And among the defining features of legal positivism include skepticism or ethical cognitivism (which would exclude, for example, an author and Hart). However, since-as we know, the definitions are purely conventional and does not seem to be a decisive reason in favor of both language use, it is perhaps better to abandon these labels probably too worn and too emotionally charged to be useful. Moreover, today there is a tendency by authors from the traditioniacute; indicates, as valid law can not be done without resorting to moral, since the acceptance of the rule of recognition of the system (as opposed to what he thought Hart) entails a moral. And moral judgments are also needed to carry out operations to produce, apply and interpret the law. Also, a really interesting theory of law, that seeks to serve the practice can not simply describe the law from outside, but you have to assume, at least to some extent, an internal or hermené Dosage.
Asational, then there would be proper motivation-justification-but simply an arbitrary imposition of power, disguised with false reasons. Well, although it is true that most of the twentieth century legal positivists (but not all) have been skeptical about the moral discourse, this feature has not been included in the definition of positivism legal, so that someone could still be considered positivist and recognize, however, that at some level there is a necessary connection between law and morality.
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CH
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